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In Brief
Riedl et al. show that children as young as
3 years of age intervene on behalf of
victims as much as they do for
themselves. The authors suggest that at
an early age, children have a sense of
restorative justice centered on the
welfare of harmed individuals, with
implications for the emergence of third-
party punishment.
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An important, and perhaps uniquely human, mecha-
nism for maintaining cooperation against free riders
is third-party punishment [1, 2]. Our closest living
relatives, chimpanzees, will not punish third parties
even though they will do so when personally affected
[3]. Until recently, little attention has been paid to how
punishment and a sense of justice develop in chil-
dren. Children respond to norm violations [4]. They
are more likely to share with a puppet that helped
another individual as opposed to one who behaved
harmfully, and they show a preference for seeing a
harmful doll rather than a victim punished [5]. By
6 years of age, children will pay a cost to punish
fictional and real peers [6–8], and the threat of
punishment will lead preschoolers to behave more
generously [9]. However, little is known about what
motivates a sense of justice in children. We gave 3-
and 5-year-old children—the youngest ages yet
tested—the opportunity to remove items and prevent
a puppet from gaining a reward for second- and
third-party violations (experiment 1), and we gave
3-year-olds the opportunity to restore items (experi-
ment 2). Children were as likely to engage in third-
party interventions as they were when personally
affected, yet they did not discriminate among the
different sources of harm for the victim. When given
a range of options, 3-year-olds chose restoration
over removal. It appears that a sense of justice
centered on harm caused to victims emerges early
in childhood and highlights the value of third-party in-
terventions for human cooperation.
RESULTS
To explore the emergence and early development of third-party
interventions in the context of distributive justice, we tested 3-
and 5-year-old children using an action-based paradigm that
had been applied to chimpanzees [3]. The question was whether
children would selectively ‘‘punish’’ another individual (namely
as negative reciprocity or to impose a cost to decrease future oc-
currences of a behavior [10, 11]) and whether they would do so
on behalf of others. Inflicting costs on others need not alwaysCurrent Biology 25, 173be punitive: adults and children will even suffer a cost them-
selves to reduce another’s welfare out of a sense of fairness
and even spite [12–16]. We contrasted intentional harm (theft)
as ameasure of punishment, with unfair outcomes (spitefulness),
loss (frustration), and permitted taking (impulsive pulling). Based
on previous studies, even young infants have expectations when
observing reward distributions [17] and will act on these [18]. In-
fants will also show preferences for helpful as opposed to harm-
ful figures [19] unless the harm is warranted [20]. In addition to
allowing children to respond (i.e., pull a rope causing the table
to turn) in second-party conditions and intervene in third-party
conditions (experiment 1), we also allowed the 3-year-olds to
give and remove rewards freely (experiment 2). We predicted
that children would respond less often as the violation dimin-
ished, namely more often in response to theft than to the other
violations, more often to unfairness than to loss and permitted
taking, and more often to loss than permitted taking, and that
they would do so more often when personally affected than
when witnessing a violation.
In both experiments 1 and 2, children were tested with a large
turntable and puppet characters (Figure S1). The turntable was
divided into quarters that demarcated the child’s position, the
position of the ‘‘victim’’ (to the child’s left), the position of the
‘‘thief’’ (across from the child), and an inaccessible area called
the ‘‘cave’’ (to the child’s right). Puppets played the roles of
victim and thief as well as ‘‘stranger.’’ The table could be turned
by pulling ropes underneath it. These were only in the child’s
position and the thief’s position; the purpose of this was to
make it clear to the child that the puppet in the victim’s position
could not turn the table. In experiment 1, the child had a single
rope, allowing the table to be turned clockwise only; once pulled
to the cave position, the apparatus was locked, preventing
further movement. Children and puppets would play with toys
or eat cookies that would be present on only one quadrant of
the table. Children were assigned to one of four between-subject
treatments (theft, unfairness, loss, and permitted taking) accord-
ing to how the objects were taken and who benefitted, and they
participated in both third- and second-party within-subject con-
ditions (three trials of each, order counterbalanced between sub-
jects). Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of the different
treatments and conditions.
In experiment 1, 3- and 5-year-old children could intervene
when witnessing a third individual similarly affected, and they
could also respond when personally affected. The children either
witnessed goods being taken away from a puppet (third party
[3P]) or had the goods taken away from them (second party
[2P]); there was no effect of the order in which the conditions1–1735, June 29, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1731
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Figure 1. The Four Between-Subject TreatmentsWere Theft, Unfair, Loss, and Permitted Taking, and theWithin-Subject ConditionsWere 2P
and 3P
(A–D) Illustration of theft (A), unfair (B), loss (C), and permitted-taking (D) treatments for second-party (2P) and third-party (3P) conditions. The starting positions of
the objects on the turntable (either in front of the child or puppet 1 in the victim’s position) are shown. The arrows show the movement of the turntable caused by
puppet 2 in the thief’s position (solid lines) or the stranger puppet 3 (dashed lines). The dot at the beginning of the arrow in the permitted-taking treatments
indicates that the puppet or child allowed the objects to be moved away. See also Figure S1.werepresented (3-year-oldsp=0.973; 5-year-oldsp=0.628). The
only action available to the children was to move objects on the
table away from the thief’s position to the cave. Both 3- and
5-year-olds turned the table as often into the cave in 3P as in
2P (3-year-olds T+ = 40, n = 48 (34 ties), p = 0.448; 5-year-olds
T+ = 68, n = 72 (58 ties), p = 0.319; Figure 2). There was no differ-
encebetween thepairedconditions including2P theft and3P theft
(3-year-olds and 5-year-olds, p > 0.25; Table S1). We then exam-
ined the between-subject treatments for the two conditions sepa-
rately (e.g., 2P theft versus 2P permitted taking). When children
were directly affected by the actions of puppets (2P), 5-year-
olds put the objects into the cavemore often in the theft treatment
than in the permitted-taking treatment (p< 0.001), and 3-year-olds
tended to put objects into the cave more often in 2P theft than 2P
permitted taking (p = 0.089; Table S2). Furthermore, 5-year-olds
(p = 0.041), but not 3-year-olds (p = 0.162), moved objects into1732 Current Biology 25, 1731–1735, June 29, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Lthe cave more often in response to 2P theft than 2P loss. Both
3-year-olds (p = 0.005) and 5-year-olds (p = 0.015) were signifi-
cantly more likely to respond to 3P theft than 3P permitted taking,
and both groups of children would make objects inaccessible
when another individual lost them, even when the puppet
who benefitted was not responsible for taking them (3P unfair,
p > 0.475) or if no one else received them at all (3P loss,
p>0.723). In otherwords, the childrenmovedobjects in the unfair,
loss, and theft treatments andwould do so asmuch for the sakeof
the victim as for themselves. The fact that they were as likely to
intervene when witnessing another individual’s loss—regardless
of the cause—suggests that they focused on the consequences
for the victim rather than on the benefits or intentions of the thief
(when present). Additionally, they protested and tattled in all of
the treatments, not solely in response to theft or justwhen person-
ally affected (see Supplemental Information).td All rights reserved
AB
Figure 2. In Experiment 1, 3- and 5-Year-
Olds Turned the Table to the Inaccessible
Cave as Often in 3P as in 2P
(A and B) Proportion of trials in which 3-year-old
children (A) and 5-year-old children (B) turned the
table to move objects from the thief’s position to
an inaccessible cave. Values are expressed as
means and error bars as bootstrapped 95% con-
fidence intervals.In experiment 2, we wanted to determine whether children
would prefer to restore items by returning them to the original
possessor or intervene by making them inaccessible. As in
experiment 1, 3-year-old children and a puppet had items taken
away from them; the key difference was that children had ac-
cess to two rope ends, allowing them to turn the table freely
in either direction. In addition to allowing the children to move
objects into the cave, they could take the objects for themselves
or move them to the victim’s position. There was again no effect
of order for 2P and 3P (p = 0.433). Children were more likely to
pull objects away from the thief position in the second-party
conditions than in the third-party conditions (69% and 58%,
respectively; T+ = 43.50, n = 48 (29 ties), p = 0.031), but the
only difference was a trend for children to turn the table more
in 2P theft than 3P theft (p = 0.063; all other pR 0.438; Figure 3;
Table S3). Across 2P treatments, they were more likely to turn
the table when the thief took the objects away from them than
when they consented to having them taken (2P theft versus
2P permitted taking: p = 0.014; Table S4). There was no differ-
ence, however, between 3P theft and 3P permitted taking or any
of the other treatments (all p > 0.10). The predominant response
was to return the objects to the original owner, though they were
more likely to do this for themselves in the 2P trials than for the
victim in the 3P trials (T+ = 47.00, n = 48 (25 ties), p = 0.004).
They restored the objects more often when personally affected
by theft than when a third party was affected (p = 0.016), andCurrent Biology 25, 1731–1735, June 29, 2015 ªthey showed a tendency to do so when
consent was given (2P permitted taking
versus 3P permitted taking; p = 0.094;
Table S5). There was no difference in
restoration between 2P unfair and 3P un-
fair or between 2P loss and 3P loss (all p
R 0.5). It is worth noting that stealing
(pulling to self) was uncommon in all but
the permitted-taking treatment: this
occurred only three times in 3P theft,
twice in 3P unfair, and seven times in
3P permitted taking. Children predomi-
nantly chose the ‘‘self’’ option in the
3P permitted-taking treatment; this was
the only situation in which objects were
not restored to the original owners.
Removal—moving the object into the
cave where no one could get the
goods—was the most infrequent choice,
occurring only twice in the 2P condition
and only once in the 3P condition. As in
experiment 1, the children protestedand tattled across treatments in 3P as well as in 2P (see Supple-
mental Information).
Three-year-old children pulled the rope causing the table to
turn at a very high rate in all treatments with the exception of
the permitted-taking treatment. They were far more likely to
return items to the original owner—either themselves (2P) or
the victim puppet (3P)—than they were to do nothing, make
the items inaccessible, give them away, or steal them for
themselves. The children were more likely to return things to
themselves in 2P than in 3P, but they still reacted at a surpris-
ingly high rate when they were not directly affected. The
only group of children that did not turn the table as often as
the others were those in the permitted-taking treatment,
namely when the puppet in the victim’s position or the child
gave permission to the third puppet to take the objects
away. The children in this study appeared to focus on how
the outcomes affected the original owners and less, perhaps,
on the consequences for the puppet who only secondarily
received them.
DISCUSSION
The first experiment demonstrated that both 3- and 5-year-old
children will intervene against third-party violations, and they
will do so as much as when personally affected. Three-year-
olds did not appear to punish theft, in that they were as likely2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1733
Figure 3. In Experiment 2, 3-Year-Olds Preferred to Return Objects
to the Original Owner
Frequencywith which children turned the table to the different positions in both
2P and 3P conditions. Children could move the objects to themselves (white
bars), to the victim (gray bars), or to the cave (black bars). Note that per-
centages do not add up to 100%; trials in which the children did not pull the
table are also included.to respond to unfairness and loss; 5-year-olds did not treat an
unfair outcome differently than theft, but they did punish theft
in that they responded more often than when there was no thief
(loss), but only when personally affected. Overall, the children
appeared to be responding more to the consequences for the
victim, rather than for the act itself or the outcomes for the ben-
eficiary (in the loss condition, there were none). Spiteful motiva-
tions might have explained responses to unfairness, and, for
loss, children might have been responding out of frustration
(second party) and empathic concern (third party). One could
speculate on other motives, such as punishing for the sake of
reputation [21], a point that can be addressed in future studies.
In the second experiment, 3-year-olds did not show a taste for
removing rewards but preferred to restore objects to original
owners. Children did not match theft with theft unless the victim
willingly gave up objects, setting up a turn-taking game; they
restored objects to the victim as much as to themselves. They
enforced consequences as often in the third-party as in the sec-
ond-party conditions (although there was a tendency to be more
self-regarding), and, as in experiment 1, they did not discriminate
among theft, unfairness, and loss.
At the preschool age, children do not appear to inflict harm on
others out of a sense of justice based on deterrence or revenge
(e.g., [22]) but out of a concern for thewelfare of the victim. This is
especially striking in that they do so as much for another individ-
ual as for themselves, even before the milestone age at which
they demonstrate perspective taking on the basis of false belief
understanding (theory of mind [23]). The third-party responses of
the children are likely due to a combination of affective perspec-
tive taking, namely responding to the distress of the victims
[24, 25], and an already established norm of ownership [26]. In
our studies, children intervened when the victim was present
because the victim had no recourse for action; only the child
was in the position to act. It is possible that the protests of the
victims cued the children to act, just as expressions of distress
elicit looks of concern [25].
The two studies presented here are the clearest (and earliest)
demonstrations of third-party interventions in young children and
the first to attempt to disentangle punishment from other third-
party motivations. Whether children use these interventions as1734 Current Biology 25, 1731–1735, June 29, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ldeterrence or as a form of just deserts is a question that requires
further work. At least by the age of seven, children do respond to
the threat of punishment by behavingmore cooperatively [9], and
theywill even pay a cost to impose a cost on a norm violator (K.R.
et al., 2011, Soc. Res. Child Dev., conference presentation). As
well, it would be important to address the role of signaling on
part of the victim; children of the age of 18 months will show
concern for others even in the absence of emotional cues [24],
but requests at this age are important for eliciting sharing [27].
Furthermore, children might signal their role as enforcers [21].
To determine whether concern for victims motivates punishment
is a universal part of a child’s development, future studies could
examine children in other cultures, since adults in different
societies show patterns of third-party and altruistic punishment
[28–30]. What is clear is that already by 3 years of age, children
are capable of intervening on the behalf of others, quite unlike
our closest living relatives tested in a comparable situation [3].
It appears that in humans, intervening on the behalf of others be-
gins with a concern for the victim before becoming focused on
consequences for the perpetrator.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experiment 1
We tested 58 3-year-old children (age range [as year;month] = 3;3–3;9,
mean = 3;6, 24 boys) and 79 5-year-olds (age range = 5;3–5;9, mean = 5;6,
36 boys) in a mid-sized German city. The research was conducted in accor-
dance with the human ethics guidelines of Germany and was approved by
the department’s human ethics committee. Ten 3-year-olds were excluded
because they showed signs of distress and did not complete testing. Seven
5-year-olds were excluded due to experimenter error (one), unwillingness to
participate in the test (three), and interference with the test apparatus (three).
A pilot study on adults showed that they understood the apparatus and the
procedure and interpreted the conditions appropriately. The children were
brought to the testing room individually by an experimenter (moderator) who
introduced them to the two puppets who were controlled by two other exper-
imenters. They were then familiarizedwith the apparatus by first being asked to
pull the rope to observe the consequences, namely that the table could turn in
only one direction and would then become locked at the inaccessible cave
where objects could not be recovered. They then used the table and toys
with the puppets. The experimenter then asked the child to move the objects
after the last puppet played with them so that they would come to rest in an
inaccessible cave. This was done so that the child would know that he or
she could prevent the puppets from accessing the objects and that the pup-
pets would also know this (in effect, ‘‘trashing’’ the objects [31]). Normative
terms such as ‘‘punish’’ were not used, and none of the puppets protested,
implying consent. Children were assigned to one of four treatments (theft, un-
fair, loss, and permitted taking) according to how the objects were taken and
who benefitted (between subjects), and they participated in both 3P and 2P
conditions (within subjects, three trials of each, counterbalanced for order in
a blocked design between subjects). In theft, the thief puppet pulled the
rope, moving the turntable and claiming the objects (marble game, stamps,
or cookies) on it. In 2P theft, she pulled the objects from the child; in 3P theft,
these were taken from the victim puppet. In the unfair treatment, another pup-
pet (stranger) would enter the room and turn the objects from the child to the
thief puppet (2P unfair) or from the victim puppet to the thief puppet (3P unfair).
The loss treatment was similar, except that there was no one in the thief’s po-
sition. Finally, in the permitted-taking treatment, the child or the victim puppet
consented to the thief pulling the rope to take the objects (Figure 1). Children
could pull the rope, causing the objects to move from the thief’s position to the
cave, or do nothing. Trials ended after 1 min if they did nothing or when the ob-
jects came to rest in the cave. The puppets never communicated with or made
direct eye contact with the children (neither did the experimenters controlling
the puppets), and protests by the puppet in the victim’s position were nevertd All rights reserved
directed at the children. None of the puppets or experimenters in any way
commented on the choices made by the children.
Experiment 2
Participants were 54 3-year-olds (age range = 3;3–3;9, mean = 3;5, 30 boys).
None of the children had participated in experiment 1. Six children were
excluded from the analysis due to experimenter error (one), fear of the puppets
(two), failing to meet criteria in familiarization (one), and feeling uncomfortable
with the test (two). Children were randomly assigned to one of the four treat-
ments as before and given both 2P and 3P conditions. They were introduced
to an apparatus that had two ropes that they could pull, and the table could
move freely. Importantly, the table would not stop at the cave position; if chil-
dren wanted the objects to stop in that position, they had to stop the table
manually. Trials lasted 1 min if the children did nothing or ended once the child
hadmoved the apparatus and stopped it in one of the four positions. All trials in
both experiments were videotaped and coded for reliability (choice: Cohen’s
k = 1.000).
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
one figure, and five tables and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.014.
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